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THE SURRENDER OF FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.

THE Constitution of the United States provides that "a

person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other

crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State,

shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from

which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State

having jurisdiction of the crime." The act of Congress of

1793 imposed the duty of surrender upon the executive of the

State in which the fugitive should be found, and provided the

manner in which the charge of crime should be authenticated

for his action. It is not a little remarkable that after ninety

years' experience under the Constitution, and after many thou-

sand cases have arisen and been disposed of, nearly every ques-

tion that could arise under the constitutional provision is still

either a question in dispute or is treated by the authorities as if

it were so, and that consequently there is neither uniformity of

action among the several State executives nor uniformity of

decision in the courts. Nor is this less unfortunate than remark-

able; for the obligation to surrender fugitive offenders is older

than the Constitution, resting upon a principle of comity, the

justice and policy of which are alike manifest; but having

been made the subject of solemn compact, the duty to ob-

serve it has become the more imperative, and the failure

cannot fail to lead to unpleasant controversies. These may not

be of sufficient importance to endanger the Union, but they

must surely weaken to some extent the fraternal ties between

the several members, and to enkindle a bitterness that in some
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form will be certain to bear evil fruit.

One question indeed has been settled, but settled in such a
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way as almost necessarily to leave the others to go unsettled.

That question relates to the existence of any compulsory force

to compel obedience to the constitutional compact in the sur-

render of fugitives from justice when the State executive upon

whom a demand is made declines to comply. In the case of

the Commonwealth of Kentucky against the Governor of Ohio,

in which the Federal Supreme Court was petitioned for its

mandatory writ to compel the respondent to issue his warrant

for the surrender of an alleged fugitive, that tribunal, speaking

by the late Chief Justice Taney, after full consideration,

solemnly decided that within the sphere of federal jurisdiction

no power existed to compel obedience of the constitutional

obligation. This decision is conclusive; and so far as the federal

authority goes it leaves the State executive at liberty to per-

form his duty in this regard or to refuse to perform it at his

option. But he is not more independent of federal authority

than he is of authority within his own State; for nothing seems

plainer than that, being an independent department of the State

government, the governor cannot be coerced in the perform-

ance of executive action by any other department, which at

most can only be co-equal and co-ordinate with but not above

him. In this regard, therefore, the governor, so far as he

refuses to act, is a law unto himself. If he proceeds to act, and

a person is arrested under his command, the validity of the

arrest will undoubtedly be open to examination, as it must be

in every conceivable case where on any ground or pretence
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whatever a person under the protection of the law is deprived

of his liberty.

In the following pages some notice will be taken of the vari-

ous questions which from time to time have arisen and still

arise, and of the manner in which these have hitherto been

treated by the State authorities.

I. What is the scope of the words, "treason, felony, or

other crime," as they are used in the constitutional provision,

and what offences do they embrace?

Respecting this, several different views have been taken. It

is said by some that as the Constitution employs terms which

are general, and which in their natural and accustomed meaning

embrace all offences, and as it makes no exception and hints at
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no limitation, the manifest intent is that where a person is

charged with a violation of any of the criminal laws of one

State, and takes refuge in another, there shall be a clear and

unqualified right to have him sent back for trial and punishment

on a proper demand being made for that purpose. If this is

not the intent, it is said, then the provision establishes no

definite rule whatever; if all crimes are not embraced, but by

some unexpressed exception some are excluded, then every

State executive is left at liberty to construe the provision for

himself, and may make exceptions in his own discretion, and

all action must necessarily be arbitrary and capricious. The

only safe and reasonable rule is that which accepts common

words in their plain and ordinary meaning, especially when

their undoubted purpose was to lay down a plain and definite

rule, and when to give them any other meaning would be to

leave the whole subject without any governing rule whatever.

This has always been the view of the Federal Supreme Court,

and it may be said also to have been always the view of the

courts of New York. "Felonies and misdemeanors," say the

Court of Appeals of that State in the recent case of Lawrence,

"offences by statute and at common law, are alike within the

constitutional- provision, and the obligation to surrender the

fugitive for an act which is made criminal by the law of the

demanding State, but which is not criminal in the State upon

which the demand is made, is the same as if the alleged act

was a crime by the laws of both." 1
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It is said by others, with some appearance of reason, that by

"treason, felony, or other crime," in the Constitution, must be

intended such acts only as were criminal either at the common

law or by the common consent of civilized nations at the time

the Constitution was adopted; that the Constitution must be

understood as making use of the terms with reference to the

distinctions between criminal and other conduct which were

then generally recognized; that it could not have been the

purpose to employ legal terms in a sense which would permit

one State to enlarge at will the scope of the constitutional pro-

vision by extending the comprehension of its own criminal laws

1 People vs. Brady, 56 New York Reports, 1S2, 187.
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so as to make them embrace acts not criminal elsewhere,

thereby not only establishing inequality as between the States,

but perhaps requiring the other States to surrender as offenders

those who, in the view of its own laws, were deserving of no

punishment.

It is said by still others that the Constitution only intends

the more serious offences; it names treasons and felonies, and

the other crimes intended must be understood, according to a

familiar rule of legal interpretation, to be crimes of the same

order—that is to say, must be serious and not petty offences.

This view has been authoritatively expressed by the judges of

the Supreme Court of North Carolina. "The word crime," say

these judges, "embraces all offences against the public of an

aggravated or infamous character, as contradistinguished from

trivial offences, to which the milder term misdemeanor is

applied. . . . An assault with intent to commit felony, a

conspiracy, cheating with false tokens, are crimes. An ordinary

assault and battery, and retailing without license, are misde-

meanors." 1

These are the differing views that have been held and

expressed. In support of each of them much may be said.

Fortunately the divergency in action has not been so great as

the differences in opinion might have led us to expect; for as

the authority to surrender fugitives does not come from the

Constitution, but may be exercised independently on grounds

of inter-State comity, the instance has not often occurred of a
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State executive planting himself upon contested ground. On

the contrary, there has been for the most part a general harmony

of action, and the States have surrendered without hesitation or

scruple to each other's demands any person who was believed

to be called for in good faith as a criminal. But from time to

time a case has arisen in which the State executive, for reasons

which were peculiar to the case, has insisted upon the narrowest

construction of the Constitution which he could justify to his

own mind; and these cases have almost invariably been such as

involved party or sectional questions, and therefore were

peculiarly calculated to excite and irritate a considerable portion

of the people.

1 Case of Hughes, 1 Phillipps's N. C. Rep., 57, 64.
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Three of these cases, all involving substantially the same

question, are entitled to some notice in the constitutional his-

tory of the country. One of them was the subject of warm con-

troversy—warm at least on one side—between Governor Seward

of New York and Governor Gilmer of Virginia, at the time when

the agitation of the slavery question first began to be threaten-

ing. The legislatures of the respective States entered into the

controversy, and it excited at length that degree of irritation

that the Governor of Virginia, in retaliation for what he deemed

a refusal to obey a constitutional mandate by the Governor of

New York, expressed his firm determination to obey no more

requisitions which the latter might make upon him, and threw

up his office when he found that the people of his State were

not likely to sustain him in this extreme position.

It seems almost unnecessary to say that the case which

gave rise to this conflict, and which created so much bitterness

of feeling, was one of an offence against the institution of

slavery. The persons demanded were charged with having

stolen " a certain negro slave." The offence was not one recog-

nized as a crime by the common law, or by the common con-

sent of civilized nations, or by the laws of the State of New

York. Governor Seward upon this ground refused to recognize

it as being such a crime as was intended by the Constitution.

In his opinion, " a construction manifestly necessary to main-

tain the sovereignty of the State and the personal rights of her

citizens" would limit the cases of surrender within the bounds
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above indicated.

Governor Seward was unfortunate enough to have a similar

controversy with the State of Georgia. In the Georgia case a

person supposed to have assisted a slave to escape was charged

with the larceny of the slave, and also, with no little shrewd-

ness, with the larceny of certain articles of personal apparel—

which were, in fact, the clothes the slave wore away on her back.

These charges were presented as two offences; but Governor

Seward refused to accept the two as any thing more than a single

charge of slave-stealing. The acts complained of, as he justly

said, constituted one and the same transaction, which was not

divisible into two crimes. The case must be judged upon its

facts as they manifestly were, and not upon the facts as they
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might be ingeniously presented in formal allegations. He there-

fore refused to honor the requisition.

If precedent and authority could settle the question, Gov-

ernor Seward was not justified in holding that the Constitution

intended only such offences as were crimes at the common law,

or by the general consent of civilized nations. His own pre-

decessors had held differently, and had surrendered fugitives

who were charged in other States with statutory felonies. The

courts had also held differently; for when Governor Throop

had obeyed a requisition for the surrender of a person charged

with the statutory offence of obtaining goods by means of false

pretences, the Supreme Court of the State had examined the

case on habeas corpus, and had decided that the Governor in

issuing his warrant was only performing his constitutional

duty.1 So far as his own State was concerned, Governor Seward

was therefore taking new ground, and that too in a case affecting

in the most sensitive point the interests, feelings, and jealousies

of one half the Union.

Later than this, and while the whole country was trembling

with the premonitions of civil war, and while the great states-

men who had weathered the tempest of nullification were either

withdrawing in despair from the field of life-long labors, or

were being overthrown and cast aside in the violence of con-

tending factions, a similar controversy arose between the States

of Kentucky and Ohio, and the like demand was met with a like

refusal. It was in that case that the Federal Supreme Court
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was applied to for its writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio

executive to issue his warrant of extradition, but could find in

the Constitution no authority for such action.

The question whether slave-stealing was such "felony or

other crime" as the Constitution intended to provide for, was

one on which fair minds might honestly differ. On the one side

it might be said with no little plausibility that slavery was recog-

nized by the Constitution as then existing in the States, and

though the recognition was somewhat indirect, yet without it,

and without certain agreements having for their purpose the

security of slave property, the Constitution could never have

1 Matter of Clark, 9 Wendell's Reports, 212.

II
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been agreed upon. Security implied a necessity for making

those acts crimes which disturbed existing rights in this species

of property; and if one half the States might give shelter within

their borders to persons who committed such crimes, they would

be left at liberty, on a narrow and unfair construction of this

provision of the Constitution, to violate the spirit of one of the

chief of its compromises. On the other hand, it might be replied

that by the Constitution the States had put in clear and unmis-

takable terms all the concessions respecting slavery which they

would consent to make at all, and they could not be made to

concede more by a doubtful construction of a provision which

did not have the institution specially in view; they agreed to

the surrender of fugitive slaves, but the agreement for the sur-

render of fugitives from justice was one of comity and equality,

and they could not consent to make it one of repulsion and

inequality by giving to the words of the agreement for surrender

a meaning that would require them to surrender as criminals

persons who, according to the prevailing sentiment of their own

people, were innocent of any act which human laws should

punish.

Had the opinion of the Federal Supreme Court been

delivered in a case of which the court had jurisdiction for the

purposes of a decision on the merits, it must have been received

as settling the question. The question involved being one of

the construction of the Federal Constitution, the decision of

that court upon it, when so made as to be authoritative, would
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be final and conclusive upon all State authorities. But as the

court conceded its want of jurisdiction, what was said on the

merits was pure dictum, and strictly of no authority. The same

fate befell that case which has befallen others in which the court,

speaking without jurisdiction, has endeavored to settle principles

for the guidance of other departments or other authorities. It

is probable that no State executive in a single instance ever

varied his action because of it. The decision of the weakest

judge will be obeyed as law and followed as a precedent if he

has the power of the law behind him, when the ablest dictum of

the most eminent judge, pronounced in a case where it was

impertinent to his conclusions, will be treated with neglect.

This is especially true when the rule which the dictum lays down
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is intended for the guidance of political authorities; for these

will look for guidance to the popular sentiment which can reach

and unseat them, and not to the courts, which cannot reach

them at all.

Slavery having passed away, it might be supposed that any

discussion of the questions involved in the controversies alluded

to has now become unimportant; but this would be a mistake.

A very considerable proportion of all the cases in which requi-

sitions are made, are cases of statutory offences, and in some of

these questions may still arise which are strictly analogous to

those raised by Governor Seward. In most cases the statutes

which create such offences have a general family resemblance in

all the States, and the punishments they provide for are recog-

nized on all sides as being provided for conduct that deserves

them. But it is always possible that the peculiar ideas and

sentiments prevailing in one State may lead to statutes for the

punishment as crimes of acts which the ideas and sentiments of

another State would tolerate, and perhaps approve. It would

be surprising if the latter State should lend ready aid in the

enforcement of such statutes, or if her executive did not fall

back upon some view of the Constitution which would excuse a

refusal. It may be admissible, perhaps, to consider the prob-

able result by the suggestion of cases which, though extreme

and improbable, may not be far removed from others of the

possibility of which we may readily be convinced. Suppose a

State, after many years' trial of a prohibitory liquor law, should

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2013-06-19 15:59 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3079062
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

come at last to the conclusion that the true remedy for the evils

of intemperance was to punish the drinking of intoxicating

beverages, and should thereupon pass laws making it a felony;

is it probable that the other States would surrender fugitives for

punishment under such laws? Suppose a State were to tolerate

and sanction the institution of polygamy, and in order to protect

it should enact that the departure of a woman from a polygamous

household should be punished with stripes or with imprison-

ment; is it likely that the executive of another State to which

an offender against such a law had fled would recognize her

case as one which could have been within the contemplation of

the Convention when, as one of the securities of the Union,
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they agreed that no State should permit itself to become an

asylum for offenders against the laws of another?

It is unfortunate that the construction of such a constitu-

tional provision should be in doubt, but the following conclu-

sions seem reasonable:

1. That if the question were a new one, it might well be

held that the petty offences generally known as misdemeanors

were not intended to be embraced in the words, "felony or

other crime;" those words, as commonly used in the law, be-

ing appropriated exclusively to the more serious offences. But

they have received a broader construction, and requisitions in

the case of petty offences are sometimes issued and obeyed.

2. That while statutory offences are no doubt embraced, yet

that if a State were to do a thing so extraordinary as to provide

for the serious punishment of some act which the prevailing sen-

timent of the Union did not recognize as properly punishable

under human laws, the case might well be regarded as one which

presented no claim which inter-State comity should recognize

by the surrender of fugitives from it, and which, therefore,

might reasonably be treated as one the Constitution did not

embrace.

II. The second question of importance is, What is meant by

the words, "Who shall flee from justice"? Is every person

who is charged in one State with an offence against its laws to

be deemed a fugitive from justice merely because when he is

sought he is found in another State? Or, on the other hand,
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must he, according to the ordinary understanding of the term,

have fled or hastened away from the State of his supposed mis-

conduct for the very purpose of escaping prosecution under its

laws? If the first view were tenable, then a person might be

arrested in any State and surrendered to another for trial on the

mere showing that in the latter State an indictment had been

found or a complaint made in due form against him. By this

means one might be punished for constructive presence and

participation in an offence committed, if at all, at a great dis-

tance, as was actually attempted in the noted case of the

Mormon prophet Smith, who was arrested as a fugitive from a

State where he had never been, and was ordered to be sur-

rendered for trial for offences against laws to which he had never
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been subject.1 Such a construction would be intolerable. But

on the other hand it could hardly be required that the accused

should actually have hastened away from the State from fear of

prosecution. Crimes are sometimes not discovered for many

years, and when they immediately become known the real offend-

er is often not at first suspected, and if under such circumstan-

ces he shall have removed from the State openly, and for ap-

parently lawful cause, he should nevertheless be deemed a fugi-

tive when his connection with the crime is discovered. The

evidence of his being a fugitive would be found in the fact

that he left the State without awaiting the consequences of his

conduct ;' not very conclusive evidence certainly, but to require

more would in many cases defeat the proceeding altogether.

III. Under the Constitution the person who shall be sur-

rendered must be charged with crime. This means that he shall

be charged in due form of law, in some proper judicial proceeding

instituted in the State from which he is a fugitive. This charge

is to be the foundation for the demand, and for the warrant of

surrender; and it cannot be sufficient unless it contains all the

legal requisites for the arrest of the accused and his detention

for trial if he were then within the State. Therefore nothing

short of an indictment, or of a complaint under oath making

out a primd-facie case, can be sufficient. This manifestly is what

is intended by the Constitution, and it is what the legislation of

Congress requires. The judicial decisions all hold that nothing

less can justify executive action.
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IV. A further question of the highest importance regards the

nature and qualities of the showing which must be presented to

the executive upon whom the demand is made, in order to

charge him with the duty of issuing his warrant of surrender.

This question must first be passed upon by the executive him-

self, but when he has decided that the showing is sufficient, and

has issued his warrant, the person arrested is not concluded by

his decision, but may raise it anew in some judicial proceeding

instituted for the purpose of obtaining his discharge. The

executive has no general power to issue warrants of arrest, and

when he proceeds to do so, in these cases, his whole authority

1 Ex-parte Smith, 3 McLean's Reports, 133.

8 Matter of Voorhies, 32 N. J. Rep., 141.
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comes from the Constitution and the act of Congress, and he

must keep within it. The judicial duty to release any person

unlawfully arrested, on proper application made for the purpose,

is imperative, no matter by what direction or command the ar-

rest was made. His duty could never be questioned or doubted

under any constitutional government.

What the governor is required to know is, that a case for his

action under the Constitution exists. It might be said, there-

fore, that the showing should include: I. Authentic evidence of

the charge of crime duly made in the State demanding him;

2. Evidence of the laws of that State, that it may appear that

the conduct complained of constituted an offence against them;

3. Evidence that the accused is a fugitive from that State ; and,

4. Some showing that when the warrant for his surrender is

applied for he is to be found within the State on which the

demand is made. How far all these things are conditions to

lawful action by the governor, and how complete the showing

must be, will be briefly considered.

1. The act of Congress provides how the evidence of the

charge made in the other State shall be made. There must be

a copy of the indictment or affidavit which makes the charge,

certified by the governor. By this it will be determined whether

the charge is or is not in due form of law.

2. Such certified copy, however, might or might not show

that the conduct complained of was a crime. It is a rule of

evidence that the authorities of one State may assume that the
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common law of another State is like their own, but that they

cannot take judicial notice what innovations have been made

by statutes of another State upon its common law. Therefore,

if the indictment or affidavit contains the requisites of a charge

of a common-law offence, it is presumptively a charge of crime

in due form of law. If, on the other hand, it charges as a crime

conduct that would not be criminal at the common law, the

executive of another State cannot know that such conduct is

criminal until the statute is shown which makes it so. But this

can seldom cause embarrassment, because the published volumes

of the laws of other States are generally made evidence by

statute, and the governor has only to look into the proper book
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in his own or the State library to ascertain what he is required

to know on that subject.

But possibly when he compares the indictment or affidavit

with the statute a question may arise concerning the legal

sufficiency of the charge. There may be a want of technical

accuracy in the averments, and possibly there may be a doubt

whether, if these were full, the conduct described would be

within the contemplation of the statute. Who is to decide such

questions? May the governor rightfully do so, or should he

leave them to be decided by the courts of the State whose laws

they involve? If the governor shall pass upon them he will in

doing so perform a very important judicial function, and that,

too, under circumstances of no little embarrassment; for the

construction of the laws of any State must necessarily be entered

upon at a disadvantage by any tribunal not familiar with their

administration, and with the practice and rulings under them.

In several States the courts have decided, when the question of

the sufficiency of a charge of crime was raised before them, that

it ought to be left to the courts of the State making the

demand ;1 and in Delaware this view was adhered to so strictly

that a fugitive was surrendered, notwithstanding the Superior

Court of the State, after having examined into the facts of the

case, had reached the conclusion that the alleged crime was

nothing but a civil trespass.' In New York, on the other hand,

the Court of Appeals ordered the discharge of a prisoner for

whose extradition the governor had issued his warrant, upon the
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express ground that the affidavit upon which his surrender was

demanded did not contain the formal allegations which were

necessary to make his act a crime under the laws of the State

demanding him. In doing so the difficulty attending that

course was illustrated, for there can be little doubt that the con-

clusion reached by the court respecting the charge was directly

opposed to that which the courts of the other State, familiar with

its laws, would have declared.'

1 Johnson vs. Riley, 13 Georgia Reports, 97; State vs. Buzine, 4 Harring-

ton's Rep., 572; Matter of Voorhies, 32 N. J. Rep., 141; Davis's Case, 122

Mass. Reports, 324.

a State vs. Schlemm, 4 Harrington's Rep., 577.

* People vs. Brady, 56 New York Rep., 182 ; compare People vs. Clark, 10

Mich. Rep., 310.
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3. The governor ought to have some showing under oath

that the person demanded is in truth a fugitive from the State

whose requisition is before him. This showing is as essential

as is the authentic evidence of the charge of crime, and is

demanded not more by the fair import of the Constitution than

by justice. Without it, as was shown in the case of the Mor-

mon prophet, a man has no security against being sent to dis-

tant States to answer to charges from which he could never

have fled, because he was never there.

4. Evidence that the fugitive is at the time to be found

within the State from which surrender is demanded seems not

to be required. It is certainly not needed for any purpose of

protection against wrongful arrests, and therefore should not

be held essential unless the Constitution seems to make it

necessary. But the Constitution only says that the offender

being found within the State shall be delivered up, and the

governor's warrant seems to be the proper process on which to

make search for him. If he is then found, the delivery may be

immediately made; if he is not found, the warrant can do no

harm. There seems to be no sufficient reason why, if a fugitive

is supposed to have fled from one of the Atlantic cities in the

direction of Mexico, hiding by the way, and taking unfre-

quented routes, there should not be, as speedily as possible, a

requisition and warrant of surrender awaiting him in every State

through which it may be conjectured he is likely to direct his

flight.
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V. The difficulties thicken when the executive issues his

warrant of surrender, and the fugitive is arrested under it.

Then may come in judicial action, and the question how far the

courts are at liberty to review or to go behind the executive

action, by means of an inquiry on habeas corpus. Their power

to examine the case is conceded: the question is, what limits, if

any, the principles of law set to it.

When we take up this question we are confronted with the

fact that our traditions of the danger of encroachments under

executive authority upon individual liberty have led us to

intrust this great writ of personal freedom, not to the principal

courts of the States alone, but to single judges of secondary

grade also, and in many States to inferior judicial officers whose
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sole function of any considerable importance is performed when

the opportunity is presented to pass judgment in this collateral

manner upon the action of some court or officer occupying a

position of importance and dignity superior to their own. That

the writ is greatly abused in many cases is matter of common

belief, and that great offenders when caught are sometimes set

free again, on actual or supposed technical defects in the papers

which greater legal learning would either perceive were no defects

at all, or were such clerical or unimportant errors as ought to be

disregarded, is unquestionable. It has become notorious that

when a person who has the means for a contest is arrested for

extradition, his captor must either hastily and clandestinely

remove him from the State, or he must run the gauntlet of

tribunals empowered to demand his papers and to examine them

for technical defects, with a fair probability that something will

be discovered in them that may constitute a reason, or at least

an excuse, for holding them insufficient. In many of these

cases the examination seems to proceed on the supposition that

the governor in respect to this function is to be looked upon as

an inferior magistrate, and is therefore called upon to show that

in all the steps taken by him he has proceeded with exact regu-

larity, and not varied in the least particular from the rules

governing the action of officers clothed with limited powers.

Such an assumption is a perversion of law, and the officer who

acts upon it abuses his authority.

The executive in support of his action is entitled to all the
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presumptions which support the action of courts of general juris-

diction. If his warrant on its face recites a case within the

constitutional compact, it is presumptively sufficient, and it

must be assumed that before issuing it he had before him all the

showing that the Constitution and the law require. And

although the court or officer may go behind the warrant for the

purpose of ascertaining whether, in fact, such a showing was

made, and may have the papers produced, yet it is not believed

there is any authority to raise mere questions of regularity in

the executive action. Suppose, for example, it should be

objected that the governor never had before him the proof of

the law under which the charge was made, but acted upon his

recollection of it from previous examinations, or upon the
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opinion of his attorney-general, of what concern is this to the

accused if, in fact, the governor made no mistake as to what the

law was?

Referring again to the question whether supposed defects in

the formal charge of crime should be passed upon in the State

where the arrest is made, or should be left for decision in the

State which demands the surrender, some of the practical

results of the former course may be pointed out. When that

course is adopted, the accused has three chances which he may

take before his trial is reached. First, Before the governor

when the warrant for his surrender is called for. If the governor

decides against the sufficiency of the charge, the decision is an

end of the proceeding. Second, On habeas corpus before some

court or judicial officer in the State in which the arrest is made.

Here also a decision in his favor will terminate the proceeding.

And however technical may be the objection to the formal

charge, neither of these tribunals has any authority to make

or permit amendments of papers transmitted from another

State, or otherwise to correct errors. Third, When he is

returned to the State demanding him, he may raise the same

questions anew, and no former hearing can in the least stand

in the way: it might be final if in his favor, but except for the

purposes of his return, it could have no force when against

him, either as an adjudication or as a precedent. But in the

State demanding him, if he raises technical questions, he will

probably find himself before a tribunal that, unlike the others,
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has power not merely to detect flaws in the papers, but also,

by means of amendments, to heal them. In this fact is abun-

dant reason why all supposed defects, which, according to the

ordinary course of judicial proceedings, are capable of being

rectified, should be left to be considered and dealt with by the

courts of the State whose laws the fugitive is supposed to have

violated.

VI. We have left to the last a question which is perhap? most troublesome of all, and which, though old, is coming up

anew perpetually. It is the question whether the executive

upon whom the demand is made has a discretion to obey or to

refuse to obey it. This is not the same question which the

executives of New York and Ohio had before them in the slave-
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stealing cases, for in those cases the question was whether the

offences charged were such felonies or other crimes as the Con-

stitution intended. This question is, whether, the case being

admitted to be one intended by the Constitution, and the papers

sufficient, the executive may nevertheless look behind the

papers, and for any reason which is satisfactory to his own

mind refuse to obey the requisition. The recent prominence

given to the question by the refusal of the Governor of Massa-

chusetts to honor a requisition made by the Governor of South

Carolina, on the ground that in his opinion it was not made for

the purpose of punishing the accused, but for an ulterior object,

is an illustration of its importance, as well as of the nature of

the investigations to which a recognition of the discretionary

authority may lead.

The Federal Supreme Court in the Kentucky case expressed

the clear opinion that when demand was made in due form the

State executive had no discretion to refuse obedience. A like

declaration has in several cases been made by State courts, and

there can be little doubt that this is the view generally held in

legal circles. If it is erroneous, there is no limit to the inquiries

upon which the executive may enter for the purpose of guiding

his discretion, or to the reasons upon which he may act. He

may, for example, raise the question whether the accused is

actually guilty as charged, and allow him an opportunity to

present evidence to overthrow the primd-facie case which the

papers make against him. If the executive sympathy happened
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to be enlisted for the accused, this would not be an improbable

course for him to adopt; but a hearing conducted, as this must

be, at a distance from the place where the transaction to be

investigated took place, would be one in which the accused

would be likely to have all the advantages, and would not be

likely to tend to the furtherance of justice. Moreover, it is as

well settled as any thing in the proceeding can be, that the

question of the actual guilt of the accused is one which, if the

papers are regular and sufficient, the authorities of the State on

which the demand is made have nothing whatever to do.1

1 Davis's Case, 122 Mass. Rep., 324; Lawrence's Case, 56 N. Y. Rep., 182,

187; State vs. Buzine, 4 Harrington's Rep., 572.
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When the executive enters upon such an inquiry he substitutes

himself for judge and jury to try an offence against the laws of

another State—a proceeding which it is incredible could ever

have been intended.

The executive might also raise the question of the good faith

of the prosecutor, and proceed to inquire into that as having a

proper bearing upon the application. But if the case were

being heard on its merits in the State where the offence was

committed, such an inquiry could not be suffered, unless the

prosecutor was called as a witness, and then only to a limited

extent, and for the purpose of impairing his testimony. If it is

gone into before the governor it will be on extra-judicial proofs

which the law deems untrustworthy, and the accused would have

every advantage in making them. Moreover, if the governor

was satisfied of the bad faith of the prosecutor, the fact would

have no bearing upon the prisoner's desert of punishment,

except in peculiar cases where the prosecutor, rather than the

State, was specially concerned in the conduct complained of.

The governor might also raise the question of the good faith

of the State making the demand. This would naturally be

taken as an affront, and might induce bitter feelings and lead to

bitter and mischievous controversies. Moreover, it would be in

manifest disobedience to another provision of the Constitution,

which requires that full faith and credit be given in each State

to the records and judicial proceedings of other States.

These are only a few of the questions that the governor may
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raise if obedience to the requisition vests in his discretion.

Indeed he need not raise any question at all; for if the power is

discretionary, then he may refuse from mere caprice, or because

the prevailing sentiment of his State or of his party favors it.

This view, if acted upon to any considerable extent, would bring

about a state of things which would make the constitutional

provision only the occasion for discord and irritation, and there-

fore worse than useless. This was plainly never intended, and

the duty which is imposed upon the governor is imperative, not

discretionary. One case, however, is an admitted exception—

the case, namely, where the justice of the State upon which the

requisition is made has some unsatisfied claim upon the alleged

offender which she is proceeding to enforce. He may be in
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prison or under prosecution for a breach of her own penal laws,

or he may be under arrest for some civil wrong. In either case

the State may proceed to satisfy the demands of her own laws

first, but when that is done the duty to honor the requisition

becomes imperative.1

In what is said above the word duty is used in the ordinary

sense, and is to be understood as the obligation which the Con-

stitution imposes upon the State executive. The word discre-

tion is also used in the ordinary sense, and when it is said the

executive has no discretion to refuse obedience to a proper

demand, what is meant is that the Constitution and the law do

not warrant him in the exercise of such a discretion.

Some ambiguity arises in employing the words obligation,

duty, and discretion, when speaking of public matters, by reason

of the different senses in which the words are used. The duty

to perform a particular act may be one of moral obligation or of

legal obligation. If it be one of moral obligation only, a disre-

gard of it is left to such penalties as conscience or the tribunal

of public opinion may impose. If it be one of legal obligation,

it is because the law itself has provided some means for enforc-

ing its performance, or some penalty in case performance is

neglected or refused. In a legal sense, therefore, performance

of the merely moral obligation may be said to be discretionary,

while as regards the legal duty the person upon whom it is

imposed is said to have no discretion, but must perform it at his

peril.
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In the law, however, the word diseretion is used in a still nar-

rower sense. An officer is said to have a discretionary authority

when he has powers of final action, and when no tribunal is

placed over him which can reverse or control his action, or

compel him to adopt any judgment but his own in the perform-

ance of his official duties. Thus legislators exercise discre-

tionary authority in the making of laws; and even when by the

Constitution a duty is imposed to enact some particular law, the

power is still discretionary, because no one can judge of the

duty for them, and no authority can compel performance. So

1 Taylor vs. Taintor, 16 Wallace's Rep., 366; Matter of Troutman, 24 N. J.

Rep., 634.
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the judges of the Superior Courts exercise discretionary

authority even when the rule is perfectly plain, because the rule

is to be applied according to their own judgment. But inferior

officers have no corresponding discretion: when they neglect

their duties, they may be compelled to perform them, and when

they act illegally or irregularly, their faults may be corrected or

their erroneous action set aside.

In this sense the governor of a State has a discretion to

refuse to issue his warrant for the surrender of a fugitive, even

when the papers are regular and sufficient. If he refuses obedi-

ence to the requisition, no authority can compel it. He may

plant his refusal upon any ground he may see fit to select, and,

reasonable or unreasonable, no legal force can drive him from

it. His excuse, if he gives one, may be plainly illegal or ab-

surd, or made in bad faith, but in a legal sense this is imma-

terial; as he can make his will the law for the case, it may be

said that he has a discretion to surrender the fugitives or to

refuse to do so.

But saying this does not at all raise the question of what is

his constitutional obligation. The only legal penalty for disre-

gard of any executive duty is that which may be inflicted on

impeachment, and that is one for extreme cases only; and the

fact that it may be resorted to does not at all stand in the way

of or detract from the governor's powers of final action. When,

therefore, the governor says, in a case in which the showing is

sufficient, "I shall exercise my discretion in refusing to
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surrender this fugitive," what he means is this: that having

power to refuse obedience to the requisition, and having no

fear of the only penalty which can be applied to a disobedience,

he proposes, for reasons which he may or may not avow, to

refuse.

But it is not often that the wrong of an unfortunate contro-

versy is found to be all on one side; and in this case it certainly

is not. That the process is greatly abused is well understood,

and may be said to be notorious. It takes place most often in

cases of alleged offences against property, and particularly in

cases where the charge is one of obtaining money under false

pretences. This is a charge easily made and difficult to be dis-

proved, and is quite as often made to coerce the payment of a
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private debt as for the purposes of public justice. There is

probably not a governor in the Union who has occupied his

office for any considerable time without having demands made

upon him for the surrender of fugitives who in his belief were

being reclaimed for the sole purpose of compelling them, on

fear of criminal prosecution, at a distance from home and

friends, to satisfy or secure some alleged debt. The State

executive is suspicious when the papers on such a charge are

presented to him, and, judging from his observation, is likely to

conclude that the debtor will never be prosecuted if the debt is

paid, and that, so soon as his warrant is served, negotiations

will begin, the secret basis of which will be the abandonment of

the chargeof felony on the prosecutor's demand being satisfied.

When thus impressed that a fraud is being practised upon the

Constitution, is it so very strange that he refuses to obey the

Constitution?

A few years since the governor of one of the leading States

refused to honor a requisition because it was recited in it that

the fugitive was to be returned at the prosecutor's expense.

This, to his mind, was proof that the prosecution was in the

interest of an individual, and not of the public. But at most it

could only raise a suspicion that such was the case. Public

prosecutions in England are largely at the prosecutor's cost,

and in this country, in certain cases, the complainant is required

by law to give security for the costs, as a pledge of his good faith

in the proceeding, and of his belief that probable cause exists for
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instituting it. The governor's objection, therefore, impeaches

in these cases the law itself, and if valid should constitute a

conclusive impediment to the surrender of any fugitive whose

prosecutor had thus been required to assume a pecuniary risk

in the proceeding. Probably, however, the governor's real

objection was, that he believed the case presented was color-

able only, and deceptive.

Repugnance to the surrender of fugitives also sometimes

springs from the fact that when returned they are held, not to

answer to the particular charge merely, but for prosecution upon

other demands, both civil and criminal. The question of the

right thus to hold one who has been surrendered in pursuance

of treaty stipulations has once been presented unpleasantly in
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our foreign relations, and led for a time to the suspension of

extradition, much to our disadvantage.

To obtain the surrender of a man on one charge, and then

put him upon trial on another, is a gross abuse of the consti-

tutional compact. We believe it to be a violation also of

legal principles. It is a general rule, that where by compulsion

of law a man is brought within the jurisdiction for one purpose,

his presence shall not be taken advantage of to subject him to

legal demands or legal restraint for another purpose. The legal

"privileges" from arrest when one is in the performance of a

legal duty away from his home rest upon this rule, and they are

merely the expressions of reasonable exemption from unfair

advantages. The reason of the rule applies it to these cases:

it should be held, as it recently has been in Kentucky,1 that the

fugitive surrendered to one charge is exempt from prosecution

upon any other. He is within the State by compulsion of law

upon a single accusation; he has a right to have that disposed

of, and then to depart in peace.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the chief difficulties

in the process of extradition between the States are:

1. Abuse of the process by issuing it in cases where the pur-

pose is the enforcement of a private demand rather than the

punishment of crime.

2. The claim of a discretionary authority to obey or refuse

to obey requisitions.

3. The unwarranted use of the process of fiabcas corpus in
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reviewing executive action.

4. Subjecting the returned fugitive to other demands than

the one to which he has been surrendered.

The second of these may fairly be said to spring from the first.

The first should be corrected by greater care in the executive to

whom application for a requisition is made, in satisfying himself

that it is made in the interest of public justice. There can be

no question that the executive has a true discretion here, and

he should exercise it fearlessly. The third and fourth are diffi-

culties which the judiciary should deal with. A high duty is

devolved upon them in this regard, and it is in their power, by

1 Commonwealth z-s. Hawes, 13 Bush's Reports, 697.
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careful adherence to sound and well-established principles, to do

much in removing the irritation that is so often excited by

action under this important constitutional covenant. It was

well said by Chief Justice Taney in the Kentucky case, that

nothing would be more likely to disturb the peace of the

Union, and to end in discord, than permitting an offender against

the laws of a State, by passing over a mathematical line which

divides it from another, to defy its process, and stand ready,

under the protection of the State, to repeat the offence as soon

as another opportunity offered.

12 Thomas M. Cooley.
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